Abteilung Fahrzeugtechnik
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The "Autonomous driving on the roads of the future: Villa Ladenburg Project" by the Daimler und Benz-Stiftung looks at degrees of automation that will only become technically feasible in the distant future. The treatment of the legal questions in the present chapter therefore draws heavily on the description of the use cases, which begin to provide a concrete basis for evaluating individual issues. Uncertainties in predicting future technical developments can be expected and will have a commensurate impact on the assumptions and conclusions of this chapter. The resulting uncertainty is nevertheless unavoidable if one wants to press ahead with important interrelated issues. This chapter is therefore intended as a contribution to the debate on societal aspects of automated driving from a legal perspective and not as a legalistic evaluation of the subject. The consideration will largely focus on the situation within the context of current German law. The legal views expressed are those of the author and are based on nine years of experience in the field of driver assistance system research. In terms of the underlying conception presented here, the societal dimension of autonomous vehicles addressed in the present project goes well beyond the adjustments to the legal framework currently being called for in Germany. The following will examine the question of "societal acceptance" in the context of the legal questions raised by autonomous vehicles. This line of investigation is not immediately obvious and covers only a segment of the more thoroughgoing focus of the project.
Except for corrective steering functions automatic steering is up to now only allowed at speeds up to 10 km/h according to UN Regulation No. 79. Progress in automotive engineering with regard to driver assistance systems and automation of driving tasks is that far that it would be technically feasible to realise automatically commanded steering functions also at higher vehicle speeds. Besides improvements in terms of comfort these automated systems are expected to contribute to road traffic safety as well. However, this safety potential will only be exhausted if automated steering systems are properly designed. Especially possible new risks due to automated steering have to be addressed and reduced to a minimum. For these reasons work is currently ongoing on UNECE level with the aim to amend the regulation dealing with provisions concerning the approval of steering equipment. It is the aim to revise requirements for automatically commanded steering functions (ACSF) so that they can be approved also for higher speeds if certain performance requirements are fulfilled. The paper at hand describes the derivation of reasonable system specifications from an analysis of relevant driving situations with an automated steering system. Needs are explained with regard to covering normal driving, sudden unexpected critical events, transition to manual driving, driver availability and manoeuvres to reach a state of minimal risk. These issues form the basis for the development of test procedures for automated steering to be implemented in international regulations. This holds for system functionalities like automatic lane keeping or automatic lane change as well as for addressing transition situations in which the system has to hand over steering to the driver or addressing emergency situations in which the system has to react instead of the driver.
The levels of continuous vehicle automation have become common knowledge. They facilitate overall understanding of the issue. Yet, continuous vehicle automation described therein does not cover "automated driving" as a whole: Functions intervening temporarily in accident-prone situations can obviously not be classified by means of continuous levels. Continuous automation describes the shift in workload from purely human driven vehicles to full automation. Duties of the driver are assigned to the machine as automation levels rise. Emergency braking, e.g., is obviously discontinuous and intensive automation. It cannot be classified under this regime. The resulting absence of visibility of these important functions cannot satisfy " especially in the light of effect they take on traffic safety. Therefore, in order to reach a full picture of vehicle automation, a comprehensive approach is proposed that can map out different characteristics as "Principle of Operation" at top level. On this basis informing and warning functions as well as functions intervening only temporarily in near-accident situations can be described. To reach a complete picture, levels for the discontinuous, temporarily intervening functions are proposed " meant to be the counterpart of the continuous levels already in place. This results in a detailed and independent classification for accident-prone situations. This finally provides for the visibility these important functions deserve.
The UN Regulation No. 79 is going to be amended to allow automatically commanded steering functions (ACSF) at speeds above 10 km/h. Hence, requirements concerning the approval of automatically performed steering manoeuvres have to be set in order to allow safe use of automatic steering on public roads as well as improve overall road safety for the driver and the surroundings. By order of the German Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI), BASt developed and verified physical test procedures for automatic steering to be implemented in UN Regulation No. 79. The usability of currently available test tools was examined. The paper at hand describes these test procedures and presents results from verification tests. The designated tests are divided in three sections: functionality tests, verifications for the transition of control and emergency tests. System functionality tests are auto matic lane keeping, automatic lane change and an automatic abort of an initiated lane change due to traffic. Those tests check if the vehicle remains in its lane (under normal operating conditions), is able to perform safe automatic lane change manoeuvres and if it considers other road users during its manoeuvres. Transition tests examine the vehicle's behaviour when the driver fails to monitor the system and in situations when the system has to hand over the steering control back to the driver. For instance these tests provoke driver-in-the-loop requests by approaching system boundary limitations, like missing lane markings, surpassing maximum lateral acceleration in a bend or even a major system failure. Even further the driver and his inputs are monitored and if the system detects that he is overriding system actions or contrary want to quit the driving task and unfastens the seat belt, it has to shut down and put the human back into manually control and the responsibility of driving. The last series of test consists of two emergency situations in which the system has to react to a time critical event: A hard decelerating vehicle and a stationary vehicle in front both with no lane change possibility for the ACSF vehicle. Some of the tests, especially the emergency manoeuvres, require special target vehicles and propulsion systems. Since no fully automatic steering vehicles are available, a current Mercedes E-Class with Mercedes' "drive pilot" system was used. It was shown that the vehicle is automatically able to brake to a full stop towards a static Euro NCAP target from partial-automatic driving at 90 km/h, that it could brake towards a rapidly decelerating lead vehicle when travelling at 70 km/h, that it was able during partially automatic driving to remain in its lane in normal operation conditions and to perform a automatic (driver initiated) lane change while surveilling the driver- activities.
Die Level kontinuierlicher Fahrzeugautomatisierung sind unter Fahrerassistenzexperten weithin bekannt und erleichtern das Verständnis. Sie können aber nicht Fahrzeugautomatisierung insgesamt zufriedenstellend beschreiben: Insbesondere temporär intervenierende Funktionen, die in unfallnahen Situationen eingreifen, können offensichtlich nicht nach dem Level kontinuierlicher Fahrzeugautomatisierung beschrieben werden. Diese beschreiben nämlich die zunehmende Aufgabenverlagerung vom Fahrer zur maschinellen Steuerung bei zunehmendem Automatisierungsgrad. Notbremsfunktionen, beispielsweise, sind offensichtlich diskontinuierlich und nehmen zugleich auf intensive Weise Einfluss auf die Fahrzeugsteuerung. Sie lassen sich gerade nicht sinnvoll nach dem Level kontinuierlicher Fahrzeugautomatisierung beschreiben. Das Ergebnis kann indes nicht zufriedenstellen: Die fehlende Sichtbarkeit dieser Funktionen wird ihrer Bedeutung für die Verkehrssicherheit nicht gerecht. Daher wird hier, um ein vollständiges Bild der Fahrzeugautomatisierung zu erlangen, ein umfassender Ansatz zur Beschreibung verfolgt, der auf oberster Ebene nach Wirkweise unterscheidet. Auf dieser Basis lassen sich sowohl informierende und warnende Funktionen als auch solche, die nur temporär in unfallgeneigten Situationen intervenieren, im Detail beschreiben. Das ermöglicht es, eine eigenständige Klassifikation für unfallgeneigte Situationen zu erstellen. Dies kann für diese wichtigen Funktionen die eigenständige Sichtbarkeit herstellen, die ihrer Bedeutung gerecht wird.
Automatische Lenkfunktionen sind abgesehen von korrigierenden Lenkeingriffen entsprechend der UN-Regelung Nr. 79 bisher nur in einem Geschwindigkeitsbereich bis 10 km/h erlaubt. Die Weiterentwicklung der Technik im Bereich der Fahrerassistenzsysteme und der Automatisierung der Fahraufgabe wuerden es jedoch technisch erlauben, automatische Lenkfunktionen auch bei höheren Geschwindigkeiten einzusetzen. Neben einem Zugewinn an Komfort wird von diesen Systemen auch ein Beitrag zur Erhöhung der Verkehrssicherheit erwartet. Dieses Verkehrssicherheitspotenzial wird man jedoch nur ausschöpfen können, wenn die automatisierten Lenksysteme entsprechend gestaltet sind. Insbesondere sollten mögliche Risiken auf Grund automatischen Lenkens minimiert sein. Aus diesen Gründen laufen derzeit Arbeiten auf UNECE-Ebene, die Regelung Nr. 79 über einheitliche Bedingungen für die Genehmigung der Fahrzeuge hinsichtlich der Lenkanlage in Bezug auf automatische Lenkfunktionen (ACSF = Automatically Commanded Steering Functions) zu überarbeiten, um diese unter bestimmten Bedingungen auch bei höheren Geschwindigkeiten genehmigen zu können. Der vorliegende Beitrag reflektiert diese Arbeiten und stellt die Entwicklung der technischen Anforderungen an automatisches Lenken und der für die fahrzeugtechnischen Vorschriften vorgesehenen Testprozeduren dar.
Die Level kontinuierlicher Fahrzeugautomatisierung sind unter Fahrerassistenzexperten weithin bekannt und erleichtern das Verständnis. Sie können aber nicht Fahrzeugautomatisierung insgesamt zufriedenstellend beschreiben: Insbesondere temporär intervenierende Funktionen, die in unfallnahen Situationen eingreifen, können offensichtlich nicht nach dem Level kontinuierlicher Fahrzeugautomatisierung beschrieben werden. Diese beschreiben nämlich die zunehmende Aufgabenverlagerung vom Fahrer zur maschinellen Steuerung bei zunehmendem Automatisierungsgrad. Notbremsfunktionen, beispielsweise, sind offensichtlich diskontinuierlich und nehmen zugleich auf intensive Weise Einfluss auf die Fahrzeugsteuerung. Sie lassen sich gerade nicht sinnvoll nach dem Level kontinuierlicher Fahrzeugautomatisierung beschrieben. Das Ergebnis kann indes nicht zufriedenstellen. Die fehlende Sichtbarkeit dieser Funktionen wird ihrer Bedeutung für die Verkehrssicherheit nicht gerecht. Daher wird im Beitrag, um ein vollständiges Bild der Fahrzeugautomatisierung zu erlangen, ein umfassender Ansatz zur Beschreibung verfolgt, der sich auf oberster Ebene nach Wirkweise unterscheidet. Auf dieser Basis lassen sich sowohl informierende und warnende Funktionen als auch solche, die nur temporär in unfallgeneigten Situationen intervenieren, im Detail beschrieben. Das ermöglicht es, eine eigenständige Klassifikation für unfallgeneigte Situationen zu erstellen; dies kann für diese wichtigen Funktionen die eigenständige Sichtbarkeit herstellen, die ihrer Bedeutung gerecht wird.
It is commonly agreed that active safety will have a significant impact on reducing accident figures for pedestrians and probably also bicyclists. However, chances and limitations for active safety systems have only been derived based on accident data and the current state of the art, based on proprietary simulation models. The objective of this article is to investigate these chances and limitations by developing an open simulation model. This article introduces a simulation model, incorporating accident kinematics, driving dynamics, driver reaction times, pedestrian dynamics, performance parameters of different autonomous emergency braking (AEB) generations, as well as legal and logical limitations. The level of detail for available pedestrian accident data is limited. Relevant variables, especially timing of the pedestrian appearance and the pedestrian's moving speed, are estimated using assumptions. The model in this article uses the fact that a pedestrian and a vehicle in an accident must have been in the same spot at the same time and defines the impact position as a relevant accident parameter, which is usually available from accident data. The calculations done within the model identify the possible timing available for braking by an AEB system as well as the possible speed reduction for different accident scenarios as well as for different system configurations. The simulation model identifies the lateral impact position of the pedestrian as a significant parameter for system performance, and the system layout is designed to brake when the accident becomes unavoidable by the vehicle driver. Scenarios with a pedestrian running from behind an obstruction are the most demanding scenarios and will very likely never be avoidable for all vehicle speeds due to physical limits. Scenarios with an unobstructed person walking will very likely be treatable for a wide speed range for next generation AEB systems.
It is well known that most accidents with pedestrians are caused by the driver not being alert or misinterpreting the situation. For that reason advanced forward looking safety systems have a high potential to improve safety for this group of vulnerable road users. Active pedestrian protection systems combine reduction of impact speed by driver warning and/or autonomous braking with deployment of protective devices shortly before the imminent impact. According to the Euro NCAP roadmap the Autonomous Emergency Braking system tests for Pedestrians Protection will be set in force from 2016 onwards. Various projects and organisations in Europe are developing performance tests and assessment procedures as accompanying measures to the Euro NCAP initiative. To provide synthesised input to Euro NCAP so-called Harmonisation Platforms (HP-) have been established. Their main goal is to foster exchange of information on key subjects, thereby generating a clear overview of similarities and differences on the approaches chosen and, on that basis, recommend on future test procedures. In this paper activities of the Harmonisation Platform 2 on the development of Test Equipment are presented. For the testing targets that mimic humans different sensing technologies are required. A first set of specifications for pedestrian targets and the propulsion systems as collected by Harmonisation Platform 2 are presented together with a first evaluation for a number of available tools.
The BASt-project group "Legal consequences of an increase in vehicle automation" has identified, defined and consequently compiled different automation degrees beyond Driver Assistance Systems. These are partial-, high- and full automation. According to German regulatory law, i.e. the German Road Traffic Code, it has been identified that the distinctive feature of different degrees of automation is the permanent attention of the driver to the task of driving as well as the constant availability of control over the vehicle. Partial automation meets these requirements. The absence of the driver- concentration to the traffic situation and to execute control is in conflict with the use of higher degrees of vehicle automation (i.e. high and full automation). Their use is therefore presently not compatible with German law, as the human driver would violate his obligations stipulated in the Road Traffic Code when fully relying on the degree of automation these systems would offer. As far as higher degrees of automation imply free-hand driving, further research in terms of behavioural psychology is required to determine whether this hinders the driver in the execution of permanent caution as required by sec. 1 para. 1 StVO (German Road Traffic Code). As far as liabilities according to the StVG (German Road Traffic Act) are concerned, the presently reversed burden of proof on the driver within sec. 18 para. 1 S. 2 StVG might no longer be considered adequate in case of higher degrees of automation that allow the driver to draw attention from the task of driving (in case making such use of a system would be permitted by the German Road Traffic Code). The liability of the vehicle "keeper", according to the German Road Traffic Act, would remain applicable to all defined degrees of automation. In case of partial automation, the use of systems according to their limits is accentuated. The range of use that remains within the intended must be defined closely and unmistakeably. Affecting user expectations properly can immensely help to maintain safe use, in case design-measures that exclude overreliance are not available according to the current state of the art (otherwise such measures would have to be applied primarily). In case of the higher degrees of automation that no longer require the driver- permanent attention (under the presupposition their use would be permitted by the German Road Traffic Code), every accident potentially bears the risk to cause product liability on the side of the manufacturer. Liability of the manufacturer might only be excluded in case of a breach of traffic rules by a third party or in case of overriding/ oversteering by the driver. In so far aspects of German procedural law and the burden of proof are of great importance. The project group has identified the need for further continuative research not only to advance legal assessment but also to improve basic technical conditions for vehicle automation as well as product reliability.